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purchase fuel, a Pennsylvania court refused to apply the
doctrine.4 The cases in this area are based on such divergent factual situations that precedents are not likely to be
found, and decisions usually rest on the general established
requirements of cy pres as applied to the particular facts.
It should be noted that cy pres was not intended to be
applied, and will not be applied where the trust or will
provides for a specific alternate distribution effective on
the failure of the primary charitable gift.4 2 The principle
of the doctrine is that the court should ascertain and effectuate as nearly as possible the testator's true intention,
without substituting its own judgment for that of the
testator, or creating a fictional testamentary intent.
Maryland is in an enviable position in regard to the cy
pres doctrine. In so far as its statute requires that it be
interpreted in harmony with the interpretation given by
other states which have enacted it, the Maryland courts
have available decisions from other states to guide their
deliberations. Furthermore, as a latecomer to the discussion, the Maryland courts, in areas of conflict, have the
opportunity to choose from among the earlier decisions
those which they find to be the better reasoned.
ALAN M. WILNER
Interpretation Of 'Statutes To Avoid Constitutional
Questions Re Labor Union Political Contributions
Machinistsv. Street'
A number of railroad carriers had begun work under a
union shop contract as authorized by a 1951 amendment,
Section 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act.' Under the
agreements with the union, every employee of the railroad
was required to pay, as a condition of continued employment, all assessments and dues that were normally required of union members of his particular class or trade.
"In re Vogan's Estate, 75 D. & C. 531 (Pa. 1951).
Camden Trust 0o. v. Christ's Home of Warminster, Pa., 28 N.J. Super.
466, 101 A. 2d 84 (1953) ; Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary
Soc., supra, n. 38.
' 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
'64 STAT. 1238, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152 Eleventh (1951). This section provides
for a permi88ive union shop, and was held constitutional on its face in
Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) on the grounds it
(a) was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce and (b) did not violate the First Amendment or the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
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Appellees brought an action to enjoin the enforcement of
the union shop provision of the amendment. They claimed
that the dues they were compelled to pay in order to retain
their jobs were being used to foster political causes to
which they were opposed. The state trial court, finding it
impossible to separate the money spent for political purposes and that spent for collective bargaining, concluded
that the combination of the collection of respondent's dues,
the union shop agreement and its enforcement, and Section
2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act violated First, Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendment guarantees from unwarranted invasion of personal and property rights,3 and
granted the injunction sought. The Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed, considering the constitutional question
to be whether the First Amendment's freedom of speech
guarantee and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause
were violated.4 In reversing, the Supreme Court of the
United States, not reaching the constitutional issues, held
that the section of the Railway Labor Act authorizing a
union shop does not empower a union, over an employee's
objection, to use his exacted funds to support political
causes which he opposes. It thus avoided deciding the constitutional issues raised.
The Supreme Court has developed seven self-imposed
limitations by which it has avoided ruling upon constitutional questions confessedly within its jurisdiction.5 The
seventh and final of these restraints relates to statutory
interpretation and was expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis
as follows:
8

Supra, n. 1, 745, n. 3.
'International Association of Machinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 44-45,
108 S.E. 2d 796, 807 (1959) ; and see 8upra, n. 1, 746, n. 4.
5 See Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348
(1936)
(concurring opinion) for Justice Brandeis's formulation of the first six
of these limitations or rules. The Court will not (1) pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding.
Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345; (2) "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it". Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) ; (3) will not "formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied". Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners,
8upra; (4) pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
523, 538 (1911) ; (5) pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Hendrick
v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621 (1915) ; (6) pass upon the constitutionality
of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
Great Fails Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U.S. 581 (1888).
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"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided."0
This note presents (1) a brief discussion of the basis
and underlying philosophy for the doctrine; (2) a consideration of the major factors which have traditionally determined its application in a particular situation; and (3) a
detailed analysis (through illustrations) of the manner in
which the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine in cases
concerning the spending of general union funds for political
purposes.
The philosophical basis for the constitutional avoidance
doctrine is found in a presumption that, in the absence of
clear language or reasonably unambiguous legislative history to the contrary, Congress did not intend to overstep
its constitutional limitations.7 The presumption is based
on the theory that Congress never intentionally passes a
statute which it believes will be held invalid."
The major factors or limitations which have traditionally determined the application of the self-imposed restraint doctrine in a particular situation are: (1) the ordinary usage and plain meaning of the words of a statute,
and (2) the contemporary importance of the constitutional
6
This statement of the principle originally appeared in Crowell v.
B enson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (per Hughes, C.J.). It was discussed by
Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in United States v. C.I.O.,
335 U.S. 106, 126 (1948) where he compares the principle to the "case
and controversy" rule, while admitting that the defect is not jurisdictional.
Possibly a better approach would be simply to consider the principle as
part of the broader "doctrine of necessity."
7 It is important to separate this doctrine of seeking a construction
which avoids constitutional doubts from the "presumption of constitutionality" doctrine. The latter device places the burden of establishing
unconstitutionality upon the party attacking the statute. This serves as an
aid in upholding the validity of legislation when a decision on its constitutionality has become necessary, while the doctrine under study in
this note is designed to avoid its necessity.
sAdditional support for the presumption can be found in the fact that
a large percentage of our lawmakers are legally trained and thus should
be aware of constitutional bounds. (e.g. one-half of the members of the
81st Congress were legally trained, U.S. News, Nov. 26, 1948, p. 11). However, on a case-by-case basis the approach modified by the above fact is
easily discredited as a general proposition. The legislators may (1) simply
not be aware that a constitutional problem is involved, (2) have cognizance that a constitutional question is involved but have decided it incorrectly, or (3) feel that the constitutionality is better lefit to the courts.
See Bernard, Avoidance of ConstitutionaZ Issues in the United States
Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amendment, 50 Mich L. Rev. 261,
288 (1951).
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objection. Concerning the first of these elements, due to
the Court's ever-changing view of its proper function in
construing acts of the legislature, its approach has fluctuated widely.9 On one extreme, there is the line of reasoning
adopted in Richmond Co. v. United States, ° that "it is
our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach a
conclusion which will avoid serious doubts of their constitutionality."" This kind of reasoning has frequently
given way to the opposite approach as expressed in United
States v. Reese et al. 2 In that case, which exerted a great
deal of influence on subsequent decisions,'13 the Court stated
that it was without power to give a narrow construction to
an overly broad statute 14as this would infringe on the
domain of the legislature.
Unlike the first, the Court acts with some consistency in
avoiding constitutional issues when the second element, the
:importance of the constitutional objection, is present.
:While the cases decided do not lend themselves to a con:crete formula whereby it is possible to predict whether the
:Court will apply or reject the principle in a particular
:instance, there is a clearly ascertainable overall trend. The
:stronger the constitutional doubt, the greater the likelihood
:that the Court will adopt a construction that avoids this
:doubt, and also the stronger the possibility that they will
9See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Shapiro v. U.S., 335 U.S. 1, 36-70
(1948).
- 275 U.S. 331 (1928).
11
Id., 346. Emphasis supplied. Some of the leading cases using a similar
type of approach (i.e., straining the ordinary meaning of the words of an
act to avoid constitutional doubts) are the following: Labor Board v.
Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241
U.S. 394 (1916); United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366
(1909). Two more examples of the extreme to which the Supreme Court
has gone can be seen in The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1921), where the
words "sponges taken . . . from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico" were
construed to exclude sponges taken from the Gulf but within the territorial
jurisdiction of a state; and the case United States v. Walter, 263 U.S.
14 (1923), where the phrase "any corporation in which the United States
of America is a stockholder" included only such corporations as are instrumentalities of the government.
- 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
'sSome of the leading cases following the approach of United States v.
Reese et al., id., are: United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948);
Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921) ; Butts v. Merchants
Transp'n Co., 230 U.S. 126 (1913) ; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882).
'AThus it can be seen that in applying this self-imposed restraint, the
Court is not bound by any specific constitutional or statutory commands,
and thus is left largely to its own discretion, which fluctuates in response
to the temperament of the individual justices, the facts and circumstances
attending the particular case, and other variables.
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:depart from the normal usage and meaning of the language
:of the statute.1 5
This has been especially true in cases involving First
Amendment freedoms. Here the Court has consistently
avoided a construction which would leave the legislation
open to serious questions of constitutionality.1 6 This trend
or attitude is exemplified in the Court's treatment of cases
concerning the use of union dues to espouse political causes.
The instant case is an excellent illustration of the extreme to which the Court will go in avoiding First Amendment questions. 7 By finding a dual intent of Congress in
passing the 1951 Amendment to the Railway Labor Act,"8
the majority of the Court avoided the constitutional issues
raised by the Georgia Supreme Court.1 9 Justice Brennan,
for the majority, said Congress' first purpose was to enable
the union and employer to force certain non-union employees, who enjoyed the rewards of the union's bargaining
efforts, to contribute to "legitimate" collective bargaining,
which, by law, must be conducted equally for all employees.2" The second objective was to safeguard the rights of
dissent by withdrawing from the unions a means of forcing
employees to support political causes which they openly
oppose.2 ' It is this second objective that has been most
22
severely attacked by those critical of the majority opinion.
15 or the lawyer 'the use of the principle that statutes be construed to
avoid constitutional doubts raises a difficult procedural question. Due to
the dual aspect of the principle, i.e., the statutory interpretation area and
the constitutional decision, the lawyer may be compelled to meet the
normal Oourt requirements for properly raising and preserving constitutional objections in the lower courts. In cases where counsel has argued,
because of the principle, that the statute is inapplicable, and if it is, it is
unconstitutional - the Court has not given a direct answer. However,
cases dealing with the problem indicate the Court probably will overlook
procedural shortcomings. See Linder v. United 'States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925)
where, in spite of respondent's failure to point out the threatened constitutional objection in the lower court, the :Supreme Oourt accepted his
construction to avoid the constitutional doubt and made no mention of
the procedural defect. This same type of defect was ignored in Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948) and in U.S. v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241
U.S. 394 (1916).
16See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951). "[I]t is the
duty of the federal courts to interpret federal legislation in a manner
not inconsistent with the demands of the Constitution." Three cases in
the 1961 term of the Court also serve as excellent examples: Communist
Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961) ; Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961) ; Machinists v. Street, supra, n. 1.
17Supra, n. 1.
18Supra, n. 2.
10Violationof First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment guarantees from
unwarranted invasion of personal and property rights.
'3367 U.S. 740, 750-764 (1961).
Id., 765-770.
2Justice
Black dissenting: "The very legislative history relied on by
the Court appears to me to prove that its interpretation of § 2, Eleventh is
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The Court in its reasoning begins with an assertion of
the seventh of Justice Brandeis's principles of constitutional avoidance.23 It then finds that the union's argument
that the cost of "collective bargaining" should be shared by
all who receive its benefits, was the controlling consideration with the legislature.2 4 As to why this argument was
decisive the Court points out only that it had been advanced
by the unions and, without mentioning any of the other
union arguments, the Court concludes, from its hypothesis,
that the "cost-spreading" was decisive, that Congress intended to limit the unions to the purposes advanced in that
argument. As Justice Black stresses in his dissent, "Neither
§ 2 Eleventh nor any other part of the Act contains any
implication or even a hint that Congress wanted to limit
the purpose for which a contracting union's dues should
or could be spent."25 Since Congress was acutely aware of
the huge union expenditures for political purposes2 6 and
27
did not explicitly restrict the use of union shop funds,
the majority opinion of the Supreme Court seemed to
Justice Black to be untenable.
The extremes to which the Supreme Court will go in
construing Congressional legislation so as to avoid the constitutional issue of free speech appear in the treatment of
the Taft-Hartley ban on the use of union money for politiwithout justification." Id., 784. Justice Frankfurter dissenting was also
"unable to accept the restrictive interpretation that the Court gives to
§ 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act" Id., 799.
Id., 749-750. See note 5 for the other six principles.
"Id., 761-762. See 96 Cong. Rec. 16279, 17050-51, 17055, 17057, 17058
(1951).
"367 U.S. 740, 784 (1961).
The problem in contention, that Is, the use of compelled dues for
political purposes, was considered during both the hearings and the floor
debates. Statements of Daniel P. Loomis, Chnon. of the Assoc. of W.
Railways, in hearings of S.3295, Sub-committee of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. p. 316-317, and hearings
on H.R. 7789, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st
Cong. 2d Sess. p. 160; 96 Cong. Rec. 17049-17050 (1951). See Justice Black's
dissent, 8upra, n. 24, p. 785, n. 8, "Again, in 1958, when Senator Potter
introduced his amendment to limit the use of compelled dues to collective
bargaining and related purposes, he pointed out on the floor of the
Senate that 'the fact is that under current practices in some of our labor
organizations, dissenters are being denied the freedom not to support
financially political or ideological or other activities which they may
oppose'." See 104 Cong. Rec. 11214. It could hardly be contended that the
debate on his proposal, which was defeated, indicated any generally held
belief that such use of compelled dues was already proscribed under § 2,
Eleventh or any other existing statute. See 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 104 Cong.
Rec. 11214-11224, 11330-11347 (1958).
" It is very possible that the legislators considered the existing TaftHartley ban on union political expenditures as an adequate restriction on
union use of exacted dues. 18 U.S.C.A. (1951) § 610.
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cal purposes.2 8 In United States v. C.I.O.,29 the union and
its president were indicted for contributing from union
funds to the publication of an editorial in the C.I.O. News.
The article urged the union members to support and vote
for a particular candidate in a special Congressional election held in Maryland. In a survey by a Congressional
Joint Committee on the operation of the labor law, there
was almost unanimous agreement that the C.I.O. action
definitely violated the Act."0 Four Justices of the Supreme
Court, agreeing with the District Court 3' and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 32 declared the union's
activities legitimate on the ground that the prohibition of
union politicalactivities contravenedthe FirstAmendment.
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, construed
the Act as not to cover the alleged activities. In doing so
it was forced to flout the express language of the Act 3 and
to disregard extremely persuasive evidence that the Congress had intended to prohibit such activity.
Two lower Federal Courts followed the Supreme Court's
lead in limiting the scope of the Taft-Hartley ban on
political spending in order to avoid constitutional issues.
In United States v. PaintersLocal Union No. 48135 the only

question raised by counsel for either side was the constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley ban on political expenditures, as applied to articles appearing in newspapers of
general circulation. The Court of Appeals for the Second
2 This
provision was originally enacted as Section 304 of the Labor
Management Relations Act 1947, 61 STAT. 136, 159 (1947).
'335 U.S. 106 (1948).
816 U.S. Law Week 3327, 3328-29 (1948).
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 77 F. Supp. 355,
357 (D.D.C. 1948).
2 Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,
320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E. 115
(1946).
8 That the union activity was clearly a violation of the express language
of Sec. 304. The pertinent language of the Section is as follows: "It is
unlawful for . . . any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any federal election at which Presidential or
Vice Presidential electors . . . or a delegate or resident commissioner to
Congress are to be voted for ..
"
"93 Cong. Rec. 6436-40 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). When Sec.
304 was being debated in Congress, Senator Taft was asked whether a
labor publication would be permitted to express its support for a person
that was considered pro-labor, he replied: "If it were supported by union
funds contributed by union members as union dues it would be a violation
of the law ..
" 93 Cong. Rec. 6436 (1947). In this same debatte Senator
Taft stated:
"A corporation which used such a house organ to try to elect or defeat
a political candidate would certainly be violating the law. . . . What
we are now doing is to write into the law the same prohibition with
respect to labor organizations as now exists with respect to corporations." 93 Cong. Rec. 6440 (1947).
5 79 F. Supp. 516 (D. Conn. 1948), rev'd on other grounds. 172 F. 2d
854 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Circuit held that the Act was not intended to cover such
expenditures: "It seems impossible, on principle, to differentiate the scope of that decision [United States v. C.I.O.]
from the case we have before us."'36 In United States v.
Construction& General Lab. L.U. No. 264,"' the same statutory construction as in the C.I.O. case was again used to
hold that Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act does not
prevent a union from paying its own members for the time
they spend in political activities. 3 The Court felt that a
contrary interpretation would leave a union or corporation
open to prosecution if any employee on its payroll devoted
any appreciable time to supporting a particular person
running for office.
The latest significant Supreme Court consideration of
the Taft-Hartley ban was in United States v. Auto Workers.3 9 The union was charged with using general treasury
funds to defray the cost of a commercial television broadcast in connection with primary and general elections of
representatives to Congress from the State of Michigan.
The general fund was allegedly maintained from the dues
of the members, and thus the expenditures were neither
voluntary political contributions nor subscriptions by union
members. The union moved for dismissal on two grounds.
The first was that the statute did not prohibit expenditures
of this nature, and the second, that the provisions of the
Act on their face and as construed and applied are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The District
Court, in dismissing the indictment as failing to state a
cause of action, 4° construed the statute narrowly and thus
avoided the constitutional objection. In a 6-3 opinion the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial. However, the majority refused to rule on the constitutional question on the ground that it was not absolutely
necessary to a decision. 4 Mr. Justices Black, Douglas and
Warren dissented vigorously, stating that the Act was
being construed to prohibit a union from expressing its
opinion on the issue of an election, and as such was a clear
a Id., 856. The majority opinion states that any distinction between a
union published newspaper such as in 'the C.I.O. case and an independent
radio or newspaper "seems without logical justification; nor is such a
differentiation suggested by the apparent purposes or by the terms of the
statute or by its legislative history."
101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
"Id., 875-876.
"352 U.S. 567 (1957) rehear, den. 353 U.S. 943 (1957).
40United States v. International Union, Etc., 138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich.,
1956).
41 See Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295-296. This doctrine of
"avoidance of constitutionality" is a part of this broader "doctrine of
necessity." Supra, n. 6.
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violation of the First Amendment guarantees of freedom
of speech. Though the dissenters were willing to decide
the constitutional issue raised by the majority's interpretation, they appear quite ready to apply a restrictive construction to the statute and would have decided the case
on the grounds that the proper interpretation was "to
limit the word 'expenditure' to 42activity that does not involve First Amendment rights.
While the Supreme Court may be faced with perplexing substantive constitutional issues in cases involving expenditure of union funds for political purposes,4 3 it leaves
the law in a state of confusion by construing the statute
involved to avoid the constitutional issue. 4 In the situation
presented by the principal case the Court had the difficult
task of balancing the right of individual union members
to support their own political ideologies, the union's interest in furthering legislation which it considers beneficial,
and the economic stability of a union shop. Where it is
necessary to reconcile such conflicting factors, which requires the type of investigation and regulation that only
the legislature is equipped to handle, the Supreme Court
by ruling on the constitutionality of an act could help to
clarify the situation and enable Congress to decide if
remedial legislation is needed. Such a ruling would have
two further benefits: (1) it would enable a union to determine without a test case whether its activities were legitimate, and (2) it would alleviate the criticism and loss of
prestige which necessarily results from the extreme construction that the Court was forced to reach in the instant
case in avoiding the constitutional problem.
DAVID S. CORDISH
-352 U.S. 567, 598 (1957). In support of this they cite: United States
v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1953) ; United States v. Harries, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
"The cases discussed, plus a state court decision that the federal law
does not apply to union spending in connection with state elections DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 175 P. 2d 851 (Cal.
App. 1946) - represent all of the noteworthy judicial interpretations of
what is now § 610 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 251.
Under this section there has never been a conviction against the unions.
"For example, in a case with similar facts to that of the principal case,
but with a union governed by the Taft-Hartley Act, it would be difficult
to predict an outcome. See Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley). This Act contains a permissive union shop section similar to
the Railway Labor Act. Labor Management Relations Act, § 101,
61 'STAT. 158(a) (3) (1947), 29 U.S. Code 157 (1958). But Labor Management Relations Act does contain an express provision that state right to
work laws override compulsory unionism. 14(b), 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29
U.S. Code § 154(b) (1948).

